

যুদ্ধ পরিস্থিতির ওপর মুক্তিবাহিনীর
সর্বাধিনায়কের বক্তৃতা।

এশিয়ান রেকর্ডার,
অক্টোবর ২২—২৮,
১৯৭১।

২৫ সেপ্টেম্বর,
১৯৭১।

G-in-C Of Liberation Army On War Situation :

The Commander-in-Chief of the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Army), Col. M. A. G. Osmany, declare on September 25 that the war in Bangladesh was a crusade in defence of justice and truth, and echoed the people's firm resolve to free the country, whatever the cost.

In a broadcast on the completion of six months of the freedom struggle, he said the war in Bangladesh was a national war in which the entire nation, irrespective of political beliefs, caste or creed, stood united. There could be no solution to the Bangladesh issue except on the basis of the unconditional release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people and withdrawal of the West Pakistani forces from East Bengal.

In an appeal to the people, he said : "Wherever you are in Bangladesh—in the rivulets, lakes, fields and remote recesses of the rural interior, on the highways, land routes, rural markets, industrial centres, towns and cities—strike the enemy with whatever you can find, strike him hard, destroy him. Obliterate all semblance of his existence."

Meanwhile, a news despatch disclosed that the demoralization of the West Pakistan Army was evidence by the fact that it at present manned no more than 54 of the 229 posts along the Indian border. The remaining 175 posts had been deserted by it.

At the control positions, it was present either in company strength or in one or two platoons.

This was the result of greater precision and better organization introduced by the Mukti Bahini in its operations. Instead of isolated groups rushing into haphazard fights, the Mukti Bahini now functioned according to a well-planned strategy with its thrust directed at well-defined and specific targets, like roads, bridges, railway lines and places where Pakistani troops were stationed.

Greater use of mines and explosives and raids on ships had been among the new factors of the guerrilla war. The daily West Pakistani casualties were 30 to 35.

The Mukti Bahini was giving considerable thought to plans for post-Monsoon operations. The end of rains, it was conceded, would give a tactical advantage to West Pakistani forces. They would have greater mobility and would be able to move bigger convoys. They might also make greater use of air travel.

At the same time, the Mukti Bahini, which had consolidated its gains, would be able to step up its operations primarily because of valuable local support. The lack of defence against tanks and air raids would be its handicap, which could partly be overcome by swift concentration and dispersal and through hit and run tactics.

The guerrillas had already left several visible marks—slow work at ports, heavy guards provided to ships, the Army's reluctance to move out after dark, thin attendance in offices (barely 20 per cent), closure of ordnance factories and stoppage of the Tea and Jute trade.

This and the continued exodus of refugees showed that the switch-over to a "civilian" regime clearly lacked credibility. Continuation of wholesale looting, murder, rape and killing by West Pakistani soldiers re-inforced this view.

On the average 30,000 refugees were pouring into India everyday, the grand total until September 28 having been 8,989,000. Scarcity of food medicines and medical facilities were additional reasons for the exodus.

An analysis of the influx in Tripura showed that 3,000 to 4,000 refugees were crossing over everyday. At one stage most of them were Hindus, but now Muslims constituted around 45 per cent of them. Mostly the refugees were from Comilla and Sylhet which had been the special targets of the West Pakistan Army.